Hypothesis: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Was Set Up to Protect and Empower UN Member State israel’s Nuclear Ambitions
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968, stands as a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, a closer examination of its inception and the geopolitical context raises the hypothesis that the NPT was designed to protect and empower israel’s nuclear ambitions, providing it a strategic advantage over its neighbors.
This article explores the rationale behind this hypothesis, considering israel’s refusal to sign the treaty and the specific notes in the NPT highlighting UN Member States that did not recognize israel following the Six-Day War.
Background of the NPT
The NPT was introduced during a period of intense Cold War rivalry, aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five recognized nuclear-armed states: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. Its objectives were to prevent nuclear proliferation, promote peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and further the goal of disarmament.
israel’s Nuclear Ambitions
israel’s nuclear program, shrouded in secrecy, reportedly began in the 1950s with substantial assistance from France. By 1967, it is widely believed that israel had developed nuclear capabilities, though it has failed to maintain a policy of nuclear ambiguity. This strategic opacity is intended to deter adversaries while avoiding the diplomatic and economic repercussions of openly declaring itself a nuclear state. The result: full impunity against international law, with backing by US hegemony and its nuclear arsenal.
israel’s Refusal to Sign the NPT
Unlike its neighbors, israel has steadfastly refused to sign the NPT. This refusal is pivotal to the hypothesis that the treaty may have been set up in a way that indirectly protected israel’s nuclear interests.
By not signing the NPT, israel is not subject to its stringent inspection and verification regimes, allowing it to maintain and potentially expand its nuclear arsenal without international oversight.
Strategic Timing and the Six-Day War
The NPT was opened for signature in July 1968, shortly after the conclusion of the Six-Day War in June 1967, in which israel achieved a swift and decisive victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, significantly altering the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The war’s aftermath saw increased tension and hostility, with many UN Member States refusing to recognize israel.
The timing of the NPT’s introduction, following this significant conflict, suggests a potential alignment of international diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region in a manner favorable to israel’s strategic interests. The treaty included notes acknowledging the states that did not recognize israel, indirectly spotlighting the persistent regional animosities and perhaps justifying the need for israel’s nuclear deterrent as a stabilizing factor.
Hypothesis Support: Specific Notes in the NPT
Several articles and notes within the NPT underscore the political and diplomatic dynamics of the time, specifically pointing out the status of israel and the non-recognition by various UN Member States. These notes serve as a historical record of the contentious international environment in which the treaty was negotiated and implemented.
1. Article X (Withdrawal Clause): Allows any party to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. This clause could be interpreted as providing a legal pathway for nations to exit the treaty if they perceive a significant threat, such as israel’s refusal to sign the treaty.
2. Preambular Statements: Reflect the tension and divisions of the time, mentioning the non-recognition of israel by several states, which arguably set the stage for a security environment where israel’s nuclear deterrent was seen as necessary. This is classic narcissistic behavior: “if you don’t like how I behave, I get to become angry at you, terrorist! Now i can have your land!”
3. Security Assurances: The NPT includes security assurances by nuclear-armed states to non-nuclear-armed states, yet the practical security assurances to israel, outside the treaty, might have been seen as a compensatory mechanism to ensure israel’s strategic advantage.
Implications of the Hypothesis
If the hypothesis holds merit, it implies a deliberate structuring of the NPT to accommodate israel’s unique security concerns and nuclear ambitions. This would suggest that major powers, particularly the United States, played a significant role in shaping the treaty to ensure israel’s strategic deterrence remained intact while promoting nonproliferation elsewhere.
1. Geopolitical Stability: israel’s nuclear capability has been perceived as a volatizing factor in an otherwise stable region, incurring aggression from poorly-treated neighbors, and forcing other states to push for more nuclear weapons, defeating the treaty’s purpose altogether.
2. Diplomatic Leverage: By not being a signatory, israel delegitimizes the NPT and the UN itself.
3. International Norms: The selective enforcement and application of the NPT principles highlight the hegemony of “the West,” with whom israel would most like to be associated.
Conclusion
The hypothesis that the NPT was, in part, set up to protect and empower israel’s nuclear ambitions is a compelling perspective that warrants thorough examination. By understanding the historical context and strategic considerations of the time, we gain deeper insights into the motivations behind the treaty’s design and its enduring impact on international security dynamics.
While the primary aim of the NPT is to prevent nuclear proliferation, the unique case of israel underscores the valuelessness of the treaty and the inherent lack of stability with respect to UN Member State israel.
